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Regional income disparities have increased in many European countries recently, even as 
national and supra-national policy instruments were created to correct them. To explain these 
evolutions, we develop a two-region, two-sector model with migration and public investment 
in infrastructure and education. Accumulation and creation of new ideas and technologies as 
well as migration are at the core of differential regional growth. In this framework, we assess 
the effectiveness of structural funds, modelled on the EU policy. In a numerical example 
calibrated to Portugal, we find that, to diminish the initial gap in income per capita, the 
backward region needs to receive over 8% of its own GDP in structural funds, while the 
actual disbursements were around 4%. We  also  find that maximizing innovation in the 
backward region conflicts in the short run with the goal of maximizing its income per capita. 
Moreover, the rich region has an incentive to bias the allocation of structural funds towards 
human capital formation. 
JEL-Code: O100, H700, R580, R120. 
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In many developed countries balanced regional growth is a major goal for policy mak-
ers at all administrative levels. Two things distinguish the case of the European Union
(EU). First, policies are designed and applied by a multi-layered governance structure
with both national and European institutions being concerned with various measures of
regional growth and inter-regional inequality. Second, the regional development policies
have increased in importance as the EU continued to enlarge towards countries with large
di⁄erences in terms of output per capita. The view of the European Commission is that
￿Imbalances do not just imply a poorer quality of life for the most disadvantaged regions
and the lack of life-chances open to their citizens, but indicate an under-utilization of hu-
man potential and the failure to take advantage of economic opportunities which could
bene￿t the Union as a whole1.￿Thus, given recent EU enlargement, regional development
policies2 are called for to ful￿ll an even bigger role. This brings into sharper focus the
question of how e⁄ective these funds have been in reducing the inter-regional inequality
and other imbalances, like long-term unemployment and a presumed lack of innovation.
Figure 1 summarizes the markedly di⁄erent evolutions of regional disparities across
European countries, from some degree of convergence (Greece, Italy) or stability (United
Kingdom, Spain) to signi￿cant divergence (Portugal, Germany). However, it shows un-
ambiguously that during the last three decades regional income levels have drifted further
apart in most countries, despite sustained redistribution at both national and supranational
level3.
It is straightforward to argue that a trade-o⁄ between aggregate growth and regional
equality arises whenever agglomeration forces are strong and resources are mobile. The
literature has documented the existence of this type of trade-o⁄4 and studied the nature of
the underlying agglomeration forces5. However, the dynamic interactions between agglom-
1First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, European Commission (1996)
2These policies include the Structural Funds ￿ERDF, EAGGF Guidance Section, ESF, and FIFG ￿as
well as the Cohesion Fund. In this paper we shall re⁄er generically to structural funds.
3In the mid-1980s, the European Regional Development Fund accounted for only 7.5% of the Community
budget. In the 2007-2013 period, by contrast, the Structural and Cohesion Funds will comprise 36% of
planned Community spending.
4See for example, Crozet and Koenig (2008), Br￿uninger and Niebuhr (2008) and Boldrin and Canova
(2001), among many others.
5Papers focused on long run economic growth, like Glomm (1992), Lucas (2004) or Tamura (2002) , study
the drivers of the urbanization process that leads to divergent evolutions of the "traditional" (agricultural)
country-side compared to the "modern" (industrialized) city. On the other hand, new economic geography
papers, starting with Krugman (1991) (also see Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Suedekum (2005), P￿ ueger
(2003), Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), Ottaviano and Thisse (2002), Martin and Ottaviano (2001) or Robert-














Figure 1: Coe¢ cient of variation (CV) in regional output per capita (mil. PPS, constant prices)
for NUTS 2 level regions. The values in 1977 have been normalized to one for all countries. There
is a break in the series in 1994. While the values of the CV have been normalized for smoothness,
the underlying de￿nition of regions has changed. Only regions of the former West Germany have
been included. Source: Regio-EU, Eurostat
erative processes and supranational redistribution policies have received relatively little
attention6.
In this paper, we develop a two-sector, two-region endogenous growth model to study
spatial redistribution policies, similar to those employed in the EU. In this model, creation
and accumulation of new ideas and technologies drive regional growth and disparities. We
incorporate investment in infrastructure and human capital development as the two main
outlays of public spending. Moreover, we allow for capital market integration and labor
mobility both across sectors and across regions.
The model uses the link between income and innovation at regional level to provide a
the cost of trade are essential for generating economic disparities.
6Suedekum (2005) looks at regional education policies while Brakman et al. (2002) consider the role of
government spending in locational competition.
3novel explanation of the increasing trend in the aggregate employment in science and engi-
neering (S&E) jobs. While in Kortum (1997) and Segerstrom (2007) the increasing cost of
innovations requires an increase in the labor input in research, in our paper, inter-regional
migration increases the population density. This in turn facilitates potential interactions
amongst researchers, increasing their productivity and hence induces the share of labor em-
ployed in research to increase. As regional disparities are reinforced, national employment
in innovation related sectors increases if agglomeration forces are strong enough.
In our model, regional dynamics are the joint result of endogenous forces - techno-
logical change and inter-regional migration, as well as exogenous forces - the national
and supranational policies. We use the theoretical framework to provide quantitative and
qualitative assessments of these policies. Speci￿cally, we go beyond analyzing the size of
supra-national transfers to consider the shares of such transfers allocated to infrastruc-
ture and skills improvement (education), respectively. The two outlays - public capital
investments and human capital formation - represent the main usages of structural funds,
allowing for comparative dynamics exercises with regard to changes in both their size and
composition.
In a numerical example calibrated to Portugal, we ￿nd that the structural funds, mod-
elled on EU policy, can improve the growth rate of the lagging region and slightly reduce
the regional inequality, without necessarily producing convergence. In order to diminish
the initial gap in income per capita, the backward region needs to receive over 8% of its
own GDP while the actual disbursements amounted to only 4%. We also ￿nd that max-
imizing innovation related employment in the backward region con￿ icts in the short run
with the goal of maximizing its income per capita. Moreover, the rich region has an in-
centive to bias the allocation of structural funds towards human capital formation, since
infrastructure investment in the poor region depresses migration, which in turn reduces
innovation in the rich region. The model links the regional income di⁄erences to empirical
di⁄erences in the industrial structure of each economy and generates optimal patterns of
public expenditures that can be used as a benchmark when assessing the performance of
actual policies. As a consequence, we show how supra-national transfers can improve on
the national allocations, when growth maximizing policies are pursued.
We add to a sizeable literature on regional convergence initiated by Barro and Sala-i
Martin (1992) and applied to the European regional context by de la Fuente et al. (1995),
Sala- i-Martin (1996), Boldrin and Canova (2001), Di Liberto et al. (2008), Ramajo et al.
(2008) and others. The consensus that seems to emerge from this literature is that while
there has been some substantial convergence early on, convergence may have slowed down
since about late 70s and that the role of the cohesion policies in bringing about or contribut-
4ing to convergence has been rather limited. Ramajo et al. (2008) provide some evidence
that convergence was faster in the cohesion countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland)
than in non-cohesion countries.
Our paper contributes to this literature by providing an explicit model of regional con-
vergence that takes into account the amount and the composition of the cohesion funds.
Di Liberto et al. (2008) ￿nds a signi￿cant role for public education expenditure in the
regional convergence in Italy. Similarly, de la Fuente et al. (1995) use an econometric
approach to assess the success of infrastructure and education policies in promoting re-
gional convergence in Spain. They ￿nd the actual impact of these policies to be small.
This is comparable to a claim in Boldrin and Canova (2001) that, even in the presence of
structural funds policies, convergence among European regions has been limited. Our cal-
ibrated model yields similar implications by connecting growth performance to innovation
processes.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the model of a two
region economy and de￿nes the competitive equilibrium. Section 3 solves it and analyzes
its properties. Section 4 describes the calibration and the main dynamic implications of
the model. Section 5 includes policy experiments. The ￿nal section concludes and the
appendix contains sensitivity analyses.
2 A two-region economy with internal migration
Consider an economy composed of two regions, denoted p for poor and r for rich.
Each region is inhabited by overlapping generation of two-period lived agents. Production
consists of a competitive ￿nal good sector and a monopolistically competitive intermediate
good sector, called research. We model the two regions as small open economies i.e. they
take the interest rate r as given. Each region is characterized by area Lj and population
stock Nj;t; j = fp;rg: The ￿nal good is assumed to be homogenous across regions and
its price is normalized to 1. Therefore, no trade occurs in equilibrium and the ￿nal good
markets clear in each region. There is no trade in intermediate goods.
In this economy, initial di⁄erences of per capita incomes in the two regions generate
migration from the "poor" to the "rich" region and potentially divergence both in output
levels and in growth rates. National and supra-national transfers directly a⁄ect economic
growth in the receiving region through productive public investments in infrastructure and
public education. Moreover, these public investments indirectly in￿ uence the growth in
the rich region as well, by altering the migration patterns.
5To ease notation, in the following we drop the region subscript whenever possible.
2.1 Households
In each region there is initially a large number of residents, Nt. Individuals live for two
periods, youth and old age, derive utility from consumption in both periods and dislike
congestion from population density in their region. Similar to Casella (2005) and Ciccone
and Hall (1996), this congestion depends on population density in the region in which they
reside. One can think of this disutility from congestion as deriving from increased housing
costs or longer commuting time. Individuals earn wages and save when young, get the
return on their savings when old, and consume in both periods. At the beginning of their
youth, consumers also decide whether to migrate or not. The utility of a typical agent
from generationt is
U(ct;ct+1;at) = logct + ￿ logct+1 ￿ at; (1)
where cs is consumption in periods s; where s = t;t + 1 and at is a congestion cost that
sets in once the density Nt=L in that region exceeds a certain level e N=L. For simplicity,
the congestion cost accrues in the ￿rst period of life, but results do not depend on this
assumption.
Formally, congestion costs are given by
at = ! max
 
0;




We assume ! > 0 and ￿ > 1, so that congestion costs are increasing and convex in
population density.
2.2 Production
2.2.1 The ￿nal good sector
The ￿nal good is produced using physical capital Kt, a fraction ￿t of the labor force
available in the region, Nt, a continuum of di⁄erentiated intermediate goods hit and services
￿ owing from a publicly provided good, b XG;t￿1; that is ￿nanced by tax revenues from the
previous period. The price of the ￿nal good is normalized to one. The production function
is given by









Constant returns to scale in hired factors implies ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3 = 1. The public good
can be thought of as infrastructure such as roads, utilities, contract enforcement, etc. It is
made available to all ￿rms at a zero price. However, the service ￿ ow it provides depends





This formalizes the idea that equal public spending bene￿ts more a smaller region, since
agents have better access to the above mentioned amenities. For example, the e⁄ective ￿ ow
of transportation services - in terms of distance, transportation time or congestion at peak
hours, depends on the density of the (rail)road network, measured in miles of road/tracks
per square mile.
As each region is a small open economy, the capital is available at an exogenous and
￿xed interest rate r. Capital depreciates at a constant rate, ￿k: This also implies that the
stock of physical capital is composed of local (St) and out-of-region (S
f
t ) aggregate savings,
such that:
Kt = St￿1 + S
f
t￿1: (5)
2.2.2 The research sector
Production in the research sector is similar to Romer (1987, 1990). A fraction 1￿￿t of
the workforce decides to specialize in producing di⁄erentiated goods. One interpretation
for these di⁄erentiated goods is the creation of new skills, technologies or ideas that are
used in the production of the ￿nal good. In our model, the range of technologies available
in each region plays a critical role for the income convergence as well as for migration
between regions.
The range of technologies available in period t comprises the undepreciated technologies
from the previous period and the ones newly produced. The fraction of the labor force
that specializes in producing the intermediate goods also contributes to the expansion of
the set of available varieties, according to the following law of motion.
At = At￿1(1 ￿ ￿) + B
￿






where 0 < ￿ < 1; 0 < ￿ < 1; 0 < ￿ < 1; B > 0. The productivity of research increases with
the density of innovators, (1￿￿t) Nt=L and the e⁄ective quality of the education system in
7that region, b XE;t￿1. Glomm (1992) and Lucas (2004) develop a model in which output is
produced by coalitions of agents who access each other￿ s experience, hence density is crucial
for productivity. Ciccone and Hall (1996) show that in the US, the density of economic
activity explains more than half of the variance in output per worker. Furthermore, Carlino
et al. (2007) document a strong positive correlation between employment density and the
per capita patent count.
Publicly ￿nanced education has been extensively used in models of human capital accu-
mulation by Loury (1981), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Fernandez and Rogerson (1998)
or Blankenau and Simpson (2004). In this model, the new varieties that are developed by
a researcher are akin to human capital, hence it is natural to consider the role of education
in stimulating the productivity of research. The overall education quality available to re-
searchers increases with the funds available for education and decreases with the number





Here XE;t￿1 is public education expenditures which are ￿nanced from the previous
period tax revenues and 1 ￿ ￿t is the fraction of labor force in the research sector. Notice
that the public expenditure in period t depends on the tax revenues in the previous period
and thus on the level of technology at t ￿ 1. This dependence indirectly introduces a
"standing on the shoulders of giants e⁄ect" as in Jones (2005) and Romer (1990), albeit in
a congestible manner.
Notice that in our model, the same agents invent and commercialize the intermediate
goods, hence they combine innovation and entrepreneurship functions. For simplicity we
label them researchers. Moreover, we assume that the previously invented technologies
that are still viable become "common knowledge" and thus cannot be sold at a pro￿t.
This is a reasonable assumption given a period in this model is 30 years, while maximum
patent protection does not exceed 20 years. Previously invented technologies are produced
and sold competitively.
Each researcher contributes @At=@((1￿￿t) Nt) new goods over which she has monopoly
power. Intermediate goods of all varieties are produced one for one from the consumption
good. Since the ￿nal good is the numØraire, the marginal cost of an intermediate good is
constant and equal to one. Denote the price of the ith variety of intermediate good as pit
and by ￿t the total pro￿t of a researcher.
In equilibrium, agents are indi⁄erent between providing labor services in the ￿nal goods
sector or engaging in research. Since agents have the same preferences, the indi⁄erence
8condition boils down to life-time income equalization,
wt = ￿t: (8)
This condition determines the fraction of the labor force engaged in creating and selling
intermediate goods 1 ￿ ￿t:
An important issue that arises in a two-region economy is the presence of knowledge
spillovers between regions. Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi (2006) ￿nd that in the European
Union this type of spillovers decrease very fast with distance, becoming insigni￿cant in
locations farther than 3-hour drive time. In a related study, Varga (2000) ￿nds that in
the US the cut-o⁄ distance for knowledge spillovers is between 50 and 75 miles. A second
factor found by Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi (2006) to drastically limit the capacity of
regions to assimilate knowledge spillovers is the size of agricultural employment. In this
case "relying on knowledge spillovers is no substitute of local investment in R&D"7.
While the distance argument is inherently weaker in the case of a small country (such
as Portugal, in our calibration exercise), signi￿cant di⁄erences in agricultural employment
across Portuguese regions (see table 1) motivate us to exclude knowledge spillovers from
the model. Moreover, we indirectly capture the idea of inter-regional spillovers, by incor-
porating national redistribution into our calibration. Since public spending is productive
in our model, increasing the budget of the poor region by reallocating resources from the
rich region achieves a similar e⁄ect to knowledge spillovers.
2.3 Migration
By the non-arbitrage condition (8), the wage earned by labor is equal in equilibrium to
the pro￿t earned by researchers. Thus, the utility level of all agents in a given region is the
same. There are no monetary migration costs. However, increased population density in a
region induces welfare losses through congestion. An agent in the poor region migrates if
the overall utility level she gets in the rich region exceeds that of staying. In each period,
















where U denotes the utility enjoyed in each region and cj;t; cj;t+1; aj;t; Nj;t, Lj refer
respectively to consumption ￿ ows, congestion costs, population and area in region j, where
j = fp;rg.
7Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi (2006), p.17
9Given initial di⁄erences in population and/or technology, the regional economy dy-
namics is characterized by sustained migration and divergence in output. Given su¢ cient
spatial redistribution, convergence can also obtain. The migration pattern depends on the
congestion parameters speci￿ed in the utility function: !;￿ and e N; which capture the scale
e⁄ect, the rate of growth and the threshold at which congestion becomes positive. Both
national and supranational transfers alter the migration pattern. Moreover, the e⁄ect of
both types of transfers depends on the shares allocated to infrastructure and human capital
formation.
2.4 Government
Each region has its own government that taxes income uniformly at rate ￿ which is
assumed constant over time and uses the proceeds of period t to ￿nance the public goods
described above at period t + 1 such that a balanced budget is maintained each period.
The government budget constraint is
XE;t + XG;t 6 Rt = ￿(wt￿tNt + ￿t(1 ￿ ￿t)Nt + rtSt￿1 + rtS
f
t￿1); (10)
where XE;t, XG;t are the two expenditure outlays, public education and infrastructure
respectively and Rt is the total tax revenue.
Since we have assumed each region is a small open economy, the stock of capital used
each period will not generally be equal to the savings from that region. For simplicity, we
assume that both local and out-of-region savings are taxed in the region where the capital
was used.
2.5 Regional transfers
In addition to national investment, we incorporate supra-national policies in the form of
structural funds. Expenditures on each of these outlays is assumed to be a ￿xed proportion
￿E or ￿G of the budget size Rt of the recipient region
XE;t = ￿ERt, ￿E > 0 (11)
XG;t = ￿GRt, ￿G > 0, ￿G + ￿E 6 1: (12)
10We model the structural funds as a fraction of the poor region￿ s GDP accruing to its public
budget.
SFt = ￿SFYp;t = ￿ Rp;t
where ￿SF and ￿ are the fractions of structural funds in total output and total tax rev-
enue of the lagging region, respectively. Thus, the amounts invested in education and
infrastructure in the poor region are given by the following expressions:
XE;p;t = (￿E + ￿SF
E )Rp;t = ￿EYp;t; (13)
XG;p;t = (￿G + ￿SF
G )Rp;t = ￿GYp;t;
where ￿SF
E and ￿SF
G are the shares devoted to education and infrastructure, respectively.
Notice that the structural funds enter the government budget constraint (10) only on
the expenditure and not on the revenue side. Our modelling of these structural funds cor-
responds to what Chatterjee et al. (2003) call "productive transfer". This implies that all
structural funds are used in their entirety to augment the productive government expen-
ditures; there is no unproductive expenditure or waste.
In addition to structural funds, which accrue to a region￿ s budget without diminishing
the resources in the other region, in our quantitative exercise we also allow for national
level redistribution of tax proceeds from the rich region to the poor region.
2.6 Equilibrium







t=0 and migration ￿ ows
fmtg
1
t=0 such that, in each region, for a given set of government policies f￿j;XG;j;t;XE;j;tg
1
t=0:
1) Given the prices, the allocations fcj;t;cj;t+1 ;sj;tg
1
t=0 solve the household￿ s problem;










t=0 satis￿es the intersectoral labor allocation condition (8);
4) The migration ￿ ow fmtg
1
t=0 solves the utility indi⁄erence condition given by (9) each
period;
5) Prices are determined by marginal conditions;
6) Final goods markets clear so that








j;itdi = Yj;t; (14)
117) Government budget is balanced.
The last two terms in (14) represent the demand for ￿nal good stemming from the
intermediate goods producers. In the following section we state and solve the problems
solved by households and ￿rms.
3 Solving the model
3.1 The household problem
Here we specify the household￿ s maximization problem. Strictly speaking, there are
two di⁄erent problems, one problem for a production worker and one problem for a worker
in the research sector. A simple arbitrage condition requires that workers in both sectors
receive the same income. Apart from this di⁄erence, the two problems are the same. We
therefore only state one problem, namely the problem for a worker in the production sector.
max
ct;ct+1;st
logct + ￿ logct+1 ￿ at (15a)
s.t. ct + st 6 wt(1 ￿ ￿) (15b)
ct+1 6 (1 + (1 ￿ ￿)rt+1)st: (15c)
given {wt;rt+1;￿}.
3.2 Firm￿ s problem in ￿nal good sector
Production of the consumption good is standard. Firms take prices and the level of
public spending as given and maximize pro￿ts by choosing raw labor ￿tNt, the quantities
of intermediate goods hit and capital Kt:
max
￿tNt;hit;Kt
Yt ￿ wt (￿tNt) ￿ pit
Z At
0
hitdi ￿ qtKt (16)









given { b X"
G;t￿1;wt;pit;qt}:
In equilibrium, due to symmetry of the intermediate goods in the ￿nal good production,
12their prices are identical. Hence,
pt = pit =
@Yt
@hit






Usually, in models of technological change ￿ la Romer (1987), due to the above-mentioned
symmetry, all intermediate goods are produced in the same quantity. In this model however,
we have assumed that only new varieties can be sold at a pro￿t. Hence, goods produced
using previous vintage varieties are symmetrical and sold in quantity hc
t; at a price equal to
the marginal cost. On the other hand, all newly invented varieties will be sold at monopoly
prices in identical quantity hm
t to maximize pro￿ts: Therefore (3) becomes



























Since r is exogenous and ￿xed over time, the ￿rm￿ s choice for K will also be ￿xed so that
capital is paid its marginal value. Factoring in the depreciation, we get qt = q = r + ￿k.
3.3 Firm￿ s problem in the research sector
For each new variety, producers of the intermediate di⁄erentiated goods face the demand








it) is the demand function derived from the production function of the ￿rm in the
￿nal goods sector in (17) and the last term is the total cost of producing hm
it units (at unit
marginal cost, in terms of the ￿nal good). Having monopoly power, the producers set the
price at a markup over the marginal cost, where the markup is inversely proportional to
the elasticity of the demand curve. Together with the pro￿t de￿nition in (20), this implies
a constant price. Recall that, since the ￿nal good is the numØraire, the marginal cost is
13constant and equal to one.
pm












while old, undepreciated varieties are produced competitively and sold at marginal cost,
implying
pc
t = 1: (23)
Equations (21) and (23) yield the equilibrium quantities of each new and old variety,
hm
t and hc
t: Thus, total pro￿ts per researcher are given by
￿t = nm￿t; (24)





E;t￿1 [(1 ￿ ￿t)Nt]
￿￿1 :
3.4 Dynamics
In the following, we ￿rst focus on characterizing the dynamics of output and technology
for each of these regions in the absence of migration, taking the population size as given.
Then, we calibrate the model and endogenize the regional market size, by allowing inter-
regional migration.






















Comparing (25) and (26) the following intermediate result follows.




















































(1 ￿ ￿t)1+￿￿￿: (28)
The equilibrium labor allocation ￿t solves the nonlinear equation (28). Higher edu-
cation budgets or increased market size (e.g., due to migration) increase the fraction of
employment in research (1 ￿ ￿t) along the transition8. Thus, as the calibration section
makes clear, the model accommodates the empirical evidence9 on the steady increase in
the S&E employment share in the developed world.
Proposition 2 Given public education quality XE;t￿1 and previous period technology At￿1;
there is a unique and interior equilibrium allocation of people between ￿nal good sector (￿t)
and research (1 ￿ ￿t). Moreover, ceteris paribus
1. Higher education quality in a region raises the share of researchers in the labor force:
@(1 ￿ ￿t)=@XE;t￿1 > 0;
2. Better previous period technologies decrease the incentive to become a researcher:
@￿t=@At￿1 > 0;
3. Larger markets (in terms of density) display a higher share of researchers in total
labor force: @￿t=@Nt < 0 if ￿ > ￿;








Uniqueness and interiority follow from f(0) < 0;f(1) > 0 (> 0 if ￿ > 0); f0 > 0 together
with g(0) > 0;g(1) = 0 and g0 < 0 if 1 + ￿ > ￿: Increased education quality shifts g down,
decreasing the equilibrium ￿t: A higher population density has a similar e⁄ect. On the
8On the other hand, the increase in the technology level, At implies a decrease in ￿t: However, a high
depreciation rate for intermediate goods varieties can make this e⁄ect negligible.
9See Kortum (1994) and Kortum (1997).
15contrary, a higher technology index in the previous period (or a lower depreciation rate of
these technologies) shifts g; thus increasing ￿t:

































(1 ￿ ￿)At￿1 +
B
L￿X￿
















￿ = 1 ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿1:
Thus, output, innovation and technological level at period t depend only on parameters,
previous period technologies and policy allocations. Note that the expression in square
parentheses is just the current range of intermediate goods At; adjusted for the quantity
di⁄erence between new and old varieties.
The output of a region depends positively on the infrastructure quality XG;t￿1. There
are two channels through which the quality of public education XE;t￿1 a⁄ects output -
directly, through the current technology (see the second term in the square bracketed
expression) and indirectly, through the labor allocation ￿t, since @￿t=@XE;t￿1 < 0 as
established in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Given a total public budget Rt￿1 and a technology level, At￿1; there exists
an optimal allocation between public education and infrastructure such that the current
output Yt is maximized. This allocation also maximizes the growth rate of the economy
from t ￿ 1 to t:
While in general the optimal allocation cannot be found analytically, it is useful for
generating some intuition to focus on the special case of an economy that starts from




￿￿3(1 ￿ ￿3) + ￿2
:
10Clearly, this would also imply no production in the previous period and hence a zero budget. However,
for the purpose of this exercise, we assume an exogenous budget Rt:






























Using the notation XG;t = ￿GRt and XE;t = ￿ERt = (1 ￿ ￿G)Rt, the output maximizing








" + ￿(1 ￿ ￿3)
2 (0;1):
The growth maximizing share of infrastructure ￿￿
G is smaller than in Barro (1990)
because of the presence of the additional government spending on education.
As expected, the optimal share of infrastructure spending increases with the elasticity
of infrastructure " and decreases with the elasticity of education quality, ￿ which a⁄ects the
range of new varieties invented. However, ￿G increases with the elasticity of intermediate
goods, ￿3: This is because a higher ￿3 increases the quantity demanded of each variety
which in turn increases the weight of infrastructure in output, since hi;t depends only on
XG;t￿1. At the same time a higher ￿3 implies a more elastic demand for intermediate
goods in the ￿nal good sector which has two e⁄ects on the pro￿tability of a newly invented
variety. On the one hand, it erodes the markup so pro￿t per unit sold goes down. On
the other hand, it increases the quantity sold of each variety, so total pro￿t per variety
can go up or down. Consequently, the net e⁄ect on the fraction of people working in the





> 0; ￿3 6 1=2
< 0; ￿3 > 1=2
:
In the general case, ￿t also depends on policies and the market size. Nonetheless the
existence of an optimal policy allocation carries through. It is easy to see that ￿￿
G is always
bounded away from zero, since some infrastructure spending is essential for output, while
this is not true for investment in education, mainly because previous period technologies
ensure some intermediate goods can be produced without any investment in education
17quality.
In this section we have characterized the dynamics and the industrial structure of a
regional economy in the presence of public investment in education and infrastructure,
taking as given the market size. A notable result is that the market size, more speci￿cally
the population density, determines the extent of specialization, in the form of increased
capacity to produce di⁄erentiated goods. Since the range of technologies enters linearly in
the ￿nal output production, our model displays scale e⁄ects. There is ample evidence for the
absence of such scale e⁄ects at the country level (for a discussion of these scale e⁄ects see,
for example Jones (1999)). Nonetheless, our model applies to the level of relatively small
regions such as the metropolitan area of Lisbon. While there is some evidence of negative
scale e⁄ects at the city level due to a well known paper by Glaeser et al. (1992), Cingano
and Schivardi (2004) for example argue that this result may be due to an identi￿cation
problem and provide evidence for positive scale e⁄ects at the city level. They summarize
their results as follows: ￿....the productivity regressions show substantial positive e⁄ects
of both specialization and city size on local TFP growth.￿
4 Calibration
We calibrate the model to the case of Portugal. As shown in Figure 1, the regional
dispersion has increased steadily over the last three decades. As the present model contains
only two regions, we divide the country in two groups (rich and poor) of NUTS2 regions.
The rich group includes regions with GDP per capita greater than 75% of the EU average
(only Lisabona e Vale do Tejo makes the cut) while the poor group consists of the regions
whose GDP per capita is under this cut-o⁄. Thus, the second group includes the regions
eligible to receive structural funds.
We calibrate the model to match key moments of regional level data for Portugal in
two di⁄erent years which are 25 years apart, namely 1977 and 2002, as detailed below. We
obtain regional output and labor force data in 1977 from the Euregio11 dataset and use
Eurostat data for 200212 values. In both cases, regional GDP per capita is expressed in
purchasing power parities and the cluster averages are weighted by population.
The ￿rst subscript denotes the region (p for poor, r for rich) and the second subscript
denotes the time (1 for the ￿rst period of the model, 1977 ￿ 2002). The labor force in the
11For more details on the CRENOS data on European regions, see Paci and Pigliaru (1999).
12The use of 2001 data has been conditioned by a change in the de￿nition of NUTS classi￿cation system
for Portugal that took e⁄ect in 2003. Data consistent with the 1977 de￿nition are taken from The Third










































*Purchasing Power Standard **population weighted
Table 1: Portuguese regions
poor region in 1977 is normalized Np;1 = 1 so that Nr;1 = 0:37. The land area of the poor
region Lp is set to 1. The area of the rich region is, in relative terms, Lr = 0:156.
We calculate average annual growth rates of the labor force at regional level between
1980 and 2002 using data from Cambridge Econometrics￿Regional Database. Extrapolat-
ing to the entire period of interest (1977￿2002), we obtain the population growth factors
of 1:055 and 1:145 in the rich and poor region, respectively (and an average growth factor
of 1:112). The same data source provide labor force estimates for 2002 ￿ 2013 by regions.
We use these ￿gures to compute growth factors of 1:047 and 1:073 for the second period
of the model. In our simulations, we also apply these growth factors to all subsequent
periods.
Using data for Portugal between 1965 ￿ 1995, Ligthart (2000) obtains an overall labor
share of 0:67, implying a capital share of 0:33.13 We set ￿1 = 0:3, in line with estimates
used by Blanchard (1998) and Conesa and Kehoe (2003) for European countries. We
calibrate ￿3 as described below and use the assumption of constant returns to scale in the
hired factors to back out ￿2 = 1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿3: The capital depreciation rate ￿k is set to a
fairly standard value of 6% annually. The discount factor is 0:99 annually, corresponding
to ￿ = 0:78 and the exogenous world-wide interest rate is set to 4% per year.
Estimates of public capital elasticity vary in the empirical literature depending on the
type of data and the econometric methodology used. While time series studies obtain
estimates as high as 0:4, panel data studies with ￿xed e⁄ects ￿nd much lower values14.
Since the elasticities of the two public investment types determine the optimal mix of
13Gollin (2002) estimates the share of employee compensation in GDP, adjusted for the income earned
by self-employed and proprietors. In the case of Portugal, that share ranges between 0:62 and 0:82 in 1990,
while the unadjusted share in 1981 is 0:476.
14Romp & de Haan (2005) provide a comprehensive review on estimates for public capital elasticity.
19public policies, in the benchmark model we want to ensure that the two elasticities are
equal in order to keep the results unbiased. We set both " and ￿ to 0:1 and perform
sensitivity analysis on these values in the appendix. We also set the depreciation rate of
ideas to ￿ = 0. In the appendix we also present the results for ￿ = 0:05 and ￿ = 0:1:
To calibrate the migration process, we normalize the scale parameter ! to one. We set
￿ = 2 so that congestion costs are quadratic. We calibrate the break-in point for congestion
e N to match migration ￿ ows, as described below. This calibrated value is allowed to grow
at the rate of population growth in the rich region. The migration pattern is determined
by using these values in the indi⁄erence condition (9).
In this model outcomes at period t depend on the size and allocation of the public
budget, which is ￿nanced by tax revenues in the previous period. Thus, in order to match
regional dynamics for Portugal from period t = 1 onward, we need the initial (t = 0)
technologies Ap;0;Ar;0 and output values Yr;0;Yp;0. We normalize the output level in the
poor region Yp;0 = 1 and use 1970 regional output15 to compute the relative output in the
rich region Yr;0 = 0:8:
We are left with six unknown parameters: initial technology levels Ap;0;Ar;0, the elas-
ticity of output with respect to skills ￿3; the productivity of new skills production B, the
elasticity of technology with respect to researchers ￿; and the break-in point for congestion
e N: To identify them, we target the following moments:
1. Per capita output ratio rich/poor 1977, (Yr;1=Nr;1)=(Yp;1=Np;1)
2. Per capita output ratio rich/poor 2002, (Yr;2=Nr;2)=(Yp;2=Np;2)
3. Average annual growth real output - rich, ￿ 77-￿ 02 (%), gY r = (Yr;2=Yr;1)
1=25 ￿ 1
4. Migration, ￿ 77-￿ 02 (% of labor force), m1
5. S&E share in labor force rich region, 1 ￿ ￿r;1
6. S&E share in labor force poor region, 1 ￿ ￿p;1
The ￿rst three moments were computed using data from the Regio and CRENOS
datasets.
Using inter-regional migration data for the periods 1979-81 and 1989-91 reported in
Rees et al. (1999), we estimate a net immigration rate into Lisabona e Vale do Tejo of
1:81% of the total labor force.
15To our knowledge this is the earliest regional output data available for Portugal. We use information
on regional GDP from Table III from National Institute of Statistics - Portugal (1970).
20The share of scientists and engineers (S&E) in total population has been used in the
literature as a proxy for the innovative class (see Kortum (1994)). In the case of Portugal,
the average share of S&E in total degrees awarded between 1979-1984 and 1985-1990 is
22% (OECD (1992), Table 3, page 12). Absent data on the distribution of S&E across
our regions of interest, we use the spatial distribution of college graduates as a proxy.
During the above-mentioned intervals, 66% of college graduates originate in the Lisbon
area (OECD (1992), page 16). Assuming graduates are uniformly distributed in space, we
use NUTS3 population stocks to adjust this proportion to the boundaries of Lisabona e
Vale do Tejo, obtaining a share of 69:9%. Using an average higher education attainment of
2:5% of active population in 1975, we compute the initial labor force share of the creative
class in the rich and poor region to be 1:423% and 0:226% respectively.
To complete the calibration, we incorporate the actual national and supranational re-
gional policies.
Parameter Value Parameter Value










































Table 2: Calibration of the benchmark model
4.1 Government Policies
According to OECD (1992), the ratio of total tax revenue to GDP is 35:2% in 1990,
so ￿ = 0:352. We proxy ￿G by the average gross public capital formation as a fraction
of GDP. According to OECD (2005), this ￿gure is approximately 4% for Portugal for the
period 1977 ￿ 2004. This value should be considered an upper bound since public capital
in OECD (2005) includes types of capital that do not enter directly in the production
function, such as public recreational facilities and the public capital in the judicial system.
Data on the share of education spending in GDP (￿E) is available only from 1995 on
and it is approximately 6%. Expressed as public budget shares, infrastructure represents
21￿G = 0:114 and education ￿E = 0:171: Table 2 summarizes the parametrization.
4.1.1 Supra-national redistribution (Structural funds)
Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) estimate that the total development support under
the structural funds has never exceeded 4% of the GDP in the poorest areas. Given
the tax rate of 35:2%, this corresponds to a share of 11:36% of the region￿ s budget. We
take this value to be the benchmark and later examine the changes in this percentage.
Thus, the budget of the poor region increases by 11:36%, while the rich region￿ s budget
remains unchanged. In terms of composition of the structural funds, Gelau⁄and Ederveen
(2006) suggest that around 20% of all available funds are spent on infrastructure projects.
Suedekum (2005) reports that 30% of the funds are directed to improvements in human
capital in the lagging regions. Since we only model the two main outlays of the EU regional
policy, we use these numbers as relative weights: 0:4 and 0:6; respectively.
To incorporate the transitory nature of the structural funds, we study the case when
they add to the national public budget outlays in period 1 only. Thus, economic activity in
period 2 is the result of infrastructure and education investments made during the previous
period, enhanced with the external contributions.
4.1.2 National redistribution
While the focus of the model is on supra-national policies, we cannot overlook the
amount of national level redistribution that has an e⁄ect on reducing the gap between rich
and poor regions. To capture this e⁄ect, we use Eurostat data on government transfers
to households and tax revenues collected in each of the ￿ve regions in the years of 1999
and 2001. The corresponding ￿gures for 1999 are presented in Table 3 below. However,
data on transfers to households provide an incomplete picture of national redistribution.
To get a better estimate of total government transfers we need to add resources transferred
from the central budget to the local governments through the national redistribution pro-
grams16. Dias and Silva (2004) report the central government transfers to municipalities
as percentage of each region￿ s GDP. We use them to calculate the transfers received by
each region through the equalization funds. Then we add these numbers to the households
transfers to get the total government transfers. The di⁄erence between the total amount of
taxes and contributions collected and the government transfers represents the government
consumption. This makes up about 8% of the total tax revenues. Consequently, we adjust
16These programs include the Financial Balance Fund, Municipalities￿General Fund, Municipal Cohesion
Fund and Parish Financing Fund. The resouces under these programs are trasferred in the form of grants

































14,517 12,377 + 17%
*numbers are in million euros
Table 3: National level redistribution, 1999
the total taxes paid in each region for the government consumption to get an estimate of
the amount contributed towards redistribution purposes.
Next, the degree of redistribution is given by the ratio of receipts by region to total
funds distributed. As shown in Table 3, we get a ratio of 0:17 for the poor region and 0:24
for the rich one, meaning that the poor region gets 17% more than it paid in taxes while
the rich region gets only 76% of what it contributed. We do the same calculations for 2001
and we get 0:19 and 0:26 for the poor and rich, respectively. Taking the mean values for
those two years, we set the redistribution shares to 18% and 25% of the tax revenues in
the poor and rich regions.
4.2 The benchmark model
Table 2 summarizes the data moments and their model analogues in the benchmark
model as well as the values of the calibrated parameters.
To assess the calibration, we compare additional data moments against the model
predictions. Thus, the average output growth in the poor region during the ￿rst period is
1:48 in the data, close to the value generated by the model, 1:65. We also compute the ratio
of average annual growth rate in the S&E share in the two regions. We use Eurostat higher
education data and NUTS3 population counts to compute shares of S&E in the labor force
in 2002 of 3:29% and 1:11% in the rich and poor region respectively. These ￿gures imply a
ratio of average annual growth rates of S&E employment of 0:51. The model counterpart
of this statistic is 0:55.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the economy over ￿ve periods or about 130 years. The
period 1977-2002 corresponds to the ￿rst time period in the model.
23Targeted moments Data Model Param. Values
Per capita output ratio rich/poor 1977
Yr;1=Nr;1
Yp;1=Np;1 1.550 1.550 B 57.69
Per capita output ratio rich/poor 2002
Yr;2=Nr;2
Yp;2=Np;2 1.636 1.636 Ar;0 68.57
Real output growth - rich, ￿ 77-￿ 02 (%) gY r 1.950 1.950 Ap;0 63.96
Migration, ￿ 77-￿ 02 (% of labor force) m2 1.810 1.810 ￿ 0.779
S&E share in labor force - rich 1 ￿ ￿r;1 1.423 1.423 e N 0.253
S&E share in labor force - poor 1 ￿ ￿p;1 0.226 0.226 ￿3 0.220
Check moments
Real output growth - poor, ￿ 77-￿ 02 (%) gY p 1.480 1.65








￿ 1 0.51 0.55
Table 4: Benchmark model outcomes and calibrated parameters. Last two rows provide
untargeted moments in the data and the model.
The model predicts that the rich region is able to sustain an increasing share of em-
ployment in the knowledge sector for the ￿rst two periods. This happens despite the
technological advance, which, per se, would imply lower pro￿tability from further innova-
tion and is essentially driven by higher education spending (due to the higher budget) but
also by the migration from the poor region as well as exogenous population increase (a
market size e⁄ect).
The increase in innovation related employment in the poor region is driven by public
spending, including the additional funding in the form of structural funds. As supra-
national funding stops in the second period, the growth of the S&E share slows down.
However, lower initial technologies together with the exogenous increase in population
generate a steady increase in the share of creative employment. Output growth rates
diverge at ￿rst and then converge at a very slow pace.
In the long run, the share of labor force in research starts decreasing, even in the rich
region (after period three), despite an ever increasing market size. The main reason for this
is the presence of "common knowledge" varieties, that cannot be sold at a pro￿t. Over time
their measure increases in total technologies, lowering the incentive to become a researcher.
This channel is also driven by the depreciation rate of ideas, which was set to zero in the
benchmark calibration. However, the sensitivity analysis included in the appendix shows
that positive depreciation rates induce only modest changes of employment in research.
The equilibrium exhibited in Figure 2 is consistent with the rising employment allocated
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Figure 2: Time paths in a two-region economy with migration
to the creation of new goods in the rich region. Unlike Kortum (1997) and Segerstrom
(2007) where the rising share of time allocated to R&D is explained by innovation becoming
more and more di¢ cult as time progresses, in our model the share of time allocated to
creating new ideas in the rich area rises because over time higher education quality and
internal migration creates more favorable conditions for R&D. Moreover, if the poor region
is depopulating fast enough, the increase in the S&E employment share in the rich region
dominates the corresponding decrease of innovation related employment in the poor region.
In the next sections we perform various counterfactual exercises to separate the e⁄ects
of the structural funds.
5 Policy experiments
The e⁄ects of development funds can now be assessed along several dimensions. We
￿rst look at the e⁄ect of varying the size of structural funds while keeping their structure
i.e. the budget shares the same. Second, we allow the composition of funding to change.
We need to keep in mind that the regions￿budget shares for infrastructure and human
capital investment also matters for the e⁄ectiveness of the structural funds in as much as
25they di⁄er from the optimal shares predicted by the model. Moreover, the optimal shares
vary with the size of the budget, hence both the quantity and composition of structural
funds will alter the way local funds are best spent.
The data suggests that national level public investment in education and infrastructure
account for 15% and respectively 10% of total revenues, which translates into 60% and
respectively 40% of total public investment. Comparing the observed shares against those
obtained in the model, one can use the direction and the size of the bias to derive normative
implications for the optimal allocations of the supplementary resources available through
structural funds.
Proposition 4 Denote the observed shares of the regional budget going to infrastructure
and educations before structural funds are disbursed, as ￿E and ￿G and the total structural
funds expressed as a share in the regional budget of the poor region with ￿: Denote the output
maximizing shares for the two outlays ￿￿
E and ￿￿
G. Also, denote the output maximizing
shares of the the structural funds disbursements as ￿SF
E and ￿SF
G .Then,
1. If ￿E > ￿￿
E and ￿E ￿ ￿￿
E > ￿, then ￿SF
E = 0 (￿SF
G = 100);
2. If ￿E < ￿￿
E and ￿￿
E ￿ ￿E > ￿, then ￿SF
E = 100 (￿SF
G = 0);
3. If ￿E < ￿￿
E and ￿￿
E ￿ ￿E < ￿, then 0 < ￿SF
E < 100 (0 < ￿SF
G < 100);
It is straightforward to see that if the actual budget shares in the poor region are
relatively far from the optimal budget shares, structural funds should be entirely allocated
either to infrastructure or education, depending on which is underfunded. If regional
shares are close to optimal values, then structural funds should be split such that the
after-redistribution shares are optimal.
The changes in the size and the allocation of the structural funds are done under the
assumption that the structural funds are available only in period 1. Finally, we study the
e⁄ects of a change in duration of structural funds.
5.1 Changes in the size of structural funds
First, we study the e⁄ects of changing the size of structural funds disbursed in period
1 in the poor region keeping the allocation across education and infrastructure constant
(60% and 40%, respectively). Recall that in the benchmark calibration we used a share of
structural funds in the poor region￿ s budget of 4% of its GDP. The structural funds are
available only in period 1.
In the counterfactual experiments we set the size of structural funds to 0%; 8%; and
12% and study the dynamics of the share of the creative class, per capita output of the two
26regions, as well as the migration between them. Figure 3 shows the time paths of these
variables under di⁄erent magnitudes of structural funds.
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Figure 3: Changes in the size of the structural funds. The benchmark (normalized to 100)
is the case of structural funds worth 4% of the poor region￿ s GDP. The other cases are:
0% (dotted line), 8% (dashed line) and 12% (solid dark line). Migration is de￿ned as the
share of total labor force that moves from the poor to the rich region.
Higher spending by doubling (tripling) the structural funds to 8% (12%) of the poor
region￿ s GDP increases its employment in the research sector by around 8% (15%) relative
to the benchmark. In the rich region there is a corresponding fall in research employment of
about 2:6% (4:8%). On the other hand, removing structural funds would cut employment
in research by 10% in the poor region but would increase it by 3:25% in the rich region
relative to the benchmark.
There is a corresponding movement in output per person in the two regions. While
the increase in output per person in the poor regions is short lived, the drop in output per
27person in the rich region is much more persistent.
These movements in research employment and in output per capita can easily be ex-
plained by (i) the direct e⁄ect of increased infrastructure and education expenditures and
(ii) the more indirect e⁄ects of the migration induced by this policy reform. Increasing
infrastructure and education spending in period 1 increases output in the poor region in
period 2. This e⁄ect is of course absent in the rich region.
The direct and the indirect e⁄ect combine to increase output per capita in the poor
region by about 5:4% when structural funds are doubled and by almost 10% when they are
tripled. Conversely, removing structural funds lowers the income per capita in the poor
region by around 6:4%.
Higher structural fund spending in the poor region increases living standards in the
poor region, slows down migration, decreases the market size for innovative activity in the
rich region, decreases the fraction of the labor force in innovative activity, which in turn
decreases the growth rate of rich region output. Increasing the structural funds to 12%
decreases rich region output in period 3 by around 1:75%.
To assess the role of external funding for regional convergence, we compare the output
per capita ratio between the rich and the poor region. In the absence of structural funds,
this ratio increases by more than 7:3%, while doubling (tripling) the size of structural funds
diminishes the ratio in output per capita by 5:4% (9:5%) relative to the benchmark. These
large changes are short lived since structural funds and only paid out in period 1.
It is also interesting to notice the time-varying behavior of migration under the funding
schemes considered. A higher spending reduces migration at ￿rst but once structural funds
are phased out, migration from the poor region continues at higher levels.
The largest migration in the ￿rst period takes place when no structural funds are
disbursed (2:31% of the labor force). This is due to both population growth and divergence
in per capita income.
The rich region has higher output per capita under less generous structural funds. This
is easy to understand for the ￿rst period, since higher migration under no structural funds
boosts innovation, through the market size e⁄ect. However, in the long run, in the absence
of external funding, migration is permanently lower. So what explains the higher income
per capita in the subsequent periods? This is due to the following two reasons. First,
migration - and hence the population stock - is lowest under no structural funds, thus
lowering the denominator of the per capita income. Second, in the benchmark calibration,
we have set the skills depreciation to zero, which preserves the gain in technologies realized
in the ￿rst period. In the appendix we examine the sensitivity of our results to this
assumption. The long run e⁄ect discussed above survives even when skills depreciate at
28a similar rate with physical capital (5%). Moreover, there is little change in the output
ratios between the two regions.
In this section we have studied the e⁄ects of changing the size of structural funds on
both the recipient economy and the rich region in the presence of inter-regional migration.
While the economy of the poor region bene￿ts in the short run from larger external funding
of infrastructure and education, the possibility to migrate mitigates these bene￿ts in the
long run.
In terms of income convergence, the analysis has revealed that much higher disburse-
ments than those observed in reality would be needed to achieve this goal. Between 1977
and 2001 the income ratio between rich and poor regions increased from about 1:55 to
about 1:64; or a change of around 6%. Doubling the structural funds to account for 8% of
the output in the poor region would keep the per capita output ratio constant. A threefold
increase of external funds generates a per capita output ratio of 1:4, or a change of around
9:5%:
5.2 Changes in the composition of structural funds
In this section, we study how the composition of structural funds expenditure (in-
frastructure vs. human capital formation) in￿ uence the equilibrium outcomes in the two
regions. Proposition 3 establishes the existence of an output (growth) maximizing allo-
cation of infrastructure and public education investment. If, due to various reasons, the
allocations from the national government are not optimal, structural funds can adjust the
mix in the right direction, provided they are used optimally.
To see how these objectives depend on the composition of structural funds, we consider
alternative budget shares while keeping the size of structural funds to 4% of poor region￿ s
GDP, as shown in Figure 4. National spending size and structure is kept constant. The
horizontal axis shows the share of infrastructure in total structural funds disbursed in
period 1. As the composition of structural funds available in period 1 has dynamic e⁄ects,
we present the outcomes associated with the ￿rst two periods.
Changing the structural funds composition has di⁄erent e⁄ects on the employment
in the knowledge creating sector in the short and the long run. Under the benchmark
calibration, to maximize ￿rst period research employment in the poor region, all funds
should go to public education (zero infrastructure share).
At the same time, this allocation lowers output per capita in the poor region since it
pushes the investment mix further away from the optimal level. This explains why funding
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Figure 4: Changes in the composition of structural funds. The benchmark infrastracture
share is 40%. Migration is de￿ned as the share of total labor force that moves from the
poor to the rich region.
hence augmenting the disparities between regions. However, allocating all funds towards
education in period 1 reduces migration in the long run (second period and onward). This
obtains because the high rate of migration in period 1 produces higher congestion and thus
discourages further migration. In turn, low migration dilutes the e⁄ective productivity of
researchers, leading to the lowest share of employment in this sector. This happens due
to the fact that public education quality displays congestion e⁄ects so, at a given budget
size, lower migration implies lower per capita e⁄ective education quality.
Besides the direct e⁄ects in the poor region, altering the composition of structural
funds impacts the economy of the rich region as well. Higher migration in the ￿rst period,
associated with directing structural funds exclusively toward education ￿nance, increases
the market size and thus increases employment in the di⁄erentiated goods sector. This
30increases the aggregate output. In per capita terms, however, the changes are marginal.
Our results are consistent with the brain-drain literature that shows that excessive ed-
ucation investment can result in increased outmigration (see Suedekum (2005)). However,
in this model, the productivity of innovators increases if the resources available in the edu-
cation system are spread over a smaller number of people, so outmigration can be a channel
of industrial diversi￿cation in backward regions. Our benchmark calibration suggests that
focusing on infrastructure investments is the most e⁄ective way to narrow regional income
di⁄erences.
Another aspect that is worth pointing out is the fact that altering public spending
patterns in the backward region a⁄ects the rich region as well. When migration is a
channel for growth, policies that reduce migration from the poor regions to rich regions, will
necessarily make the latter worse o⁄, suggesting that whenever the allocation of structural
funds is decided at the national level, rich regions will favor a high share of investment in
public education.
The ￿nding raises some questions with regard to the mechanisms used to allocate struc-
tural funds. Brakman et al. (2005) and Gelau⁄ and Ederveen (2006) report that regional
policy is biased towards infrastructure, while other studies, like Midelfart-Knarvik and
Overman (2002), point out that investments in human capital formation can be undesir-
able, since they may counteract the comparative advantage of the lagging regions. In this
model, the optimal shares of supranational funding depend not only on the relative pro-
ductivities of infrastructure and public education, but also on the timing of such funding.
Thus, the regions may have di⁄erent preferences over the allocations of structural funds,
even in the long run. This preference di⁄erence can lead to political economy problems
and biases in the cohesion policy implementation, if the eligibility of projects ￿nanced by
supranational money is partly decided at national level. This can be true even when the
mix of local policies is set optimally, since the composition of the structural funds may still
depart from it.
5.3 Changes in the duration of structural funds
In this section we study the following cases: no transfers, transfers for two and three
periods relative to the benchmark case (structural funding available only one period) keep-
ing the size and the allocation of funding constant (as in the benchmark calibration). The
results are displayed in ￿gure 5. As expected, the lowest output gap between the rich and
the poor region is obtained when the funding has the longest duration. The share of the
labor force involved in knowledge creation mirrors the evolution of output. As established
31in the ￿rst experiment, the structural funds lower the migration for the period for which
they are available. Migration increases once the supra-national funding is no longer in
place. Interestingly, the strongest increase in migration in the long-run is obtained in the
case when the structural funds are available for three periods. This obtains because in
this case there are more periods with low migration and thus lower congestion in the rich
region.
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Figure 5: Changing the duration of structural funds transfers. The benchmark (normalized
to 100) is the case of structural funds worth 4% of the poor region￿ s GDP for one period.
The other cases are: no transfers (dotted line), transfers for two (dashed line) and three
(solid dark line) periods. Migration is de￿ned as the share of total labor force that moves
from the poor to the rich region.
325.4 The role of migration
In this section we examine the importance of migration for the dynamics of the two
regions. Figure 6 shows the no migration case relative to the benchmark model, which
incorporates both structural funds and migration.
As explained above, if due to some reason (e.g. structural funds) inter-regional migra-
tion stops, the market size for research activities in the rich region increases at a lower
rate. This diminishes the innovation in that region and its output growth rate. Opposing
e⁄ects arise in the poor region. This mechanism is ampli￿ed by population growth.
Based on our calibration, stopping migration would generate an increase of output per
capita in the poor region of around 2% in period 4 and a simultaneous decline of almost
10% in the rich region. Migration thus has a substantial divergence e⁄ect.
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Figure 6: The role of migration. The benchmark (normalized to 100) is the case when
both migration (into the rich region) and structural funds are present. The case of zero
migration but structural funds is represented by a dotted line.
336 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a two-region model that allows us to study the short and
long run e⁄ects of regional redistribution policies such as the European Structural Funds.
The model features occupational choice within regions as well as endogenous labor mobility
among regions. Economic growth in the model is driven by the endogenous expansion of
technologies. There are two outlays of public spending: infrastructure and public education.
Supra-national funding of both these outlays is directed to the backward region. The model
is calibrated to the Portuguese economy.
The paper characterizes the transitional dynamics of this economy both qualitatively
and quantitatively. From a qualitative point of view, we emphasize the link between
regional agglomeration and innovation, as an alternative explanation for the overall increase
in the share of S&E employment, observed in the developed economies. We then use the
model to conduct a series of quantitative exercises.
First, we ￿nd that increasing the size of the structural funds allows the poorer regions
to catch up faster to the richer regions. This e⁄ect is of modest size. Between 1977 and
2001 the income ratio between rich and poor regions increased by around 6% from about
1:55 to about 1:64. While doubling the current structural funds received by Portugal from
4% to 8% of receiving region￿ s GDP keeps the output per capita ratio constant, a threefold
increase (to 12% of GDP) would produce convergence - a 9:5% reduction in the 1977 per
capita income ratio.
Second, changing the allocation of structural funds between education and infrastruc-
ture has sizeable growth e⁄ects which vary between the short run and the long run. We also
￿nd that the allocation of the structural funds that maximizes output in the poor region
(or minimizes divergence between the poor regions) is not optimal for the rich region since
it induces sub optimal migration.
Our model relies on a few simplifying assumptions. We assumed that migration is
costless. We also assumed that skills of workers are not sector or activity speci￿c and
that regions consume a unique, homogenous good. It stands to reason that work in the
rich region requires di⁄erent skills than work in the poor regions. We plan to introduce
such features in future work. Our model has pointed to a potentially important political
con￿ ict about the allocation of the structural funds between infrastructure and education
expenditures. The precise nature, the severity and the implications of this con￿ ict are
worthy topics for future investigations.
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387 Appendix
First, given the two public spending outlays are central to our discussion of regional
divergence and structural funds, we perform a sensitivity analysis of the model dynamics
with respect to changes in public spending elasticities for infrastructure (") and education
(￿). Second, we investigate the changes due to di⁄erent assumptions about the depreciation
rate for technologies (￿). The ￿rst ￿ve rows in the table summarize the benchmark values
for the rich and poor regions in the ￿rst two periods.
Decreasing the output elasticities with respect to public education expenditures ￿ and
infrastructure investment " decreases the e⁄ects on both output and migration. Increasing
the depreciation rate of technologies has large positive e⁄ects on migration rates.
39Rich t Rich t + 1 Poor t Poor t + 1
" = ￿ = 0:1; ￿ = 0
S&E (% labor force) 1.423 1.842 0.226 0.360
Output growth rate (% annual) 1.950 1.518 1.655 0.689
Output/capita ratio (rich/poor) 1.550 1.636
Migration (% lab for) 1.810 1.457
" = ￿ = 0:05; ￿ = 0
S&E (% labor force) 1.058 1.215 0.122 0.172
Output growth rate (% annual) 1.156 0.949 0.981 0.516
Output/capita ratio (rich/poor) 1.338 1.445
Migration (% lab for) 0.860 1.154
" = 0:05;￿ = 0:1; ￿ = 0
S&E (% labor force) 1.423 1.867 0.226 0.407
Output growth rate (% annual) 1.399 1.215 1.016 0.590
Output/capita ratio (rich/poor) 1.354 1.509
Migration (% lab for) 1.219 1.318
" = 0:1;￿ = 0:05; ￿ = 0
S&E (% labor force) 1.058 1.242 0.122 0.157
Output growth rate (% annual) 1.712 1.231 1.622 0.621
Output/capita ratio (rich/poor) 1.532 1.566
Migration (% lab for) 1.466 1.268
" = ￿ = 0:1; ￿ = 0:05
S&E (% labor force) 1.625 2.299 0.264 0.470
Output growth rate (% annual) 1.690 1.335 1.239 0.290
Output/capita ratio (rich/poor) 1.562 1.690
Migration (% lab for) 2.064 1.657
" = ￿ = 0:1; ￿ = 0:1
S&E (% labor force) 1.862 2.862 0.310 0.617
Output growth rate (% annual) 1.445 1.192 0.807 -0.111
Output/capita ratio (rich/poor) 1.575 1.758
Migration (% labor force) 2.366 1.887
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis
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